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Kiss of Death: Application of Title VII's 
Prohibition Against Religious Discrimination in  
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
I. INTRODUCTION: WILL THE FOREIGN LAW 
EXCEPTION MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 
Last spring a friend, Pete,' applied for a position with a 
U.S. firm doing business in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia? The 
ideal candidate for this position had to possess an unusual 
range of professional, technical and cultural experience. Pete's 
resume made him the ideal candidate. He spoke French and 
English and, as an additional bonus, also spoke Arabic-a 
language he acquired some years earlier while serving in the 
U.S. military. He had an undergraduate degree magna cum 
laude from Brigham Young University and the requisite num- 
ber of years work experience in the field. His track record with 
previous employers was solid. Upon considering these creden- 
tials, the interviewer from this firm told Pete he was a strong 
candidate for the job. 
As he worked his way down Pete's resume, however, the 
interviewer's attitude began to change. Slowly but noticeably, 
the look on his face went from one of interest t o  one of concern. 
The furrows on his forehead deepened. He hesitated, took a 
breath, and then uneasily advanced this question: 'You gradu- 
ated from BYU. You speak two languages other than English. 
You seem to fit the profile of an ex-Mormon missionary. You 
wouldn't happen t o  be a Mormon would you?" 
'Yes, I am a Mormon," Pete replied. 
"And did you chance to  go on one of those two year mis- 
sions for the Mormon Church?" 
1. "Pete" has consented to my telling his story in this forum on condition 
that facts be altered to conceal identities of concerned parties. Quoted material hiis 
not, however, been altered, but is taken directly from the conversation on which 
this story is based. 
2. For present purposes, it doesn't matter greatly which of the Arab Gulf 
States it was, since every one of these states is profoundly committed to Islam. 
And, the point I make with this anecdote (and in this Comment, more generally) 
regards Title VII implications of doing business in countries profoundly committed 
to Islam. 
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'Well, yes I did. But what are you driving at?" Pete won- 
dered aloud. 
In  response, the interviewer explained that another West- 
ern firm doing business in the Kingdom had recently suffered 
what might in business terms amount to "the kiss of deatW3 
after a U.S. employee with evangelical Christian convictions 
gave a Bible to a Muslim co-worker. When authorities discov- 
ered this . . . well, to put it mildly, it wasn't pleasant for any- 
one. "Not very good for business, you understand," the inter- 
viewer observed, "not very good at all." 
Pete quickly agreed and assured the interviewer that 
among the things he learned on his religious mission was when 
and how to avoid the subject of religion and that he would do 
nothing to compromise the firm's position in the Kingdom. 
Happily, Pete was convincing on this point and went on to se- 
cure the position. But Pete's job-hunting success is not the 
point here. The point here is simple: U.S. employers of U.S. 
employees working in profoundly Islamic countries sometimes 
find compelling reasons to discriminate on the basis of religion 
in  their employment practices. 
Nevertheless, we may wonder what would have happened 
had Pete not only failed to secure the position, but had the firm 
hired a less qualified, less religiously objectionable candidate. 
Had this happened, Pete could have filed a claim against the 
firm under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19914 (Title 
VI1)-an act which prohibits U.S. employers from discriminat- 
ing on the basis of religion in their hiring practices. Filing such 
a claim, however, might raise this question: Can U.S. employ- 
ers discriminate on the basis of religion when hiring U.S. em- 
ployees in  the United States for work in countries with unique 
or heightened religious sensitivities? Or, more generally, under 
what circumstances and to what extent may U.S. employers 
claim exception to Title VII's extraterritorial application? For 
answers to Title VII extraterritorial application questions such 
as these, we may, as this Comment does, look to Title VII's 
foreign law e~cept ion.~ 
This Comment considers the usefulness-and possible 
uselessness-of Title VII's foreign law exception, particularly in  
the context of religiously motivated Title W-violative policies 
3. Hence, my title. 
4. 42 U.S.C. $8 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. 1992). 
5 .  Id. $ 2000e(f). 
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and practices involving a profoundly Islamic country, the King- 
dom of Saudi Arabia. First, this Comment provides a brief 
historical overview of Title VII, its extraterritorial application, 
and the foreign law exception to that application. I t  also pro- 
vides, by way of example, a n  overview of the law of the King- 
dom, with a particular view to understanding how that law 
compares with Title VII in matters related to religious discrim- 
ination. This Comment then illustrates difficulties in applying 
the foreign law exception with three hypotheticals. Each hypo- 
thetical is factually connected with the Kingdom and the for- 
eign law exception's failure to fiilfill its functions-functions 
that  include: (1) protecting U.S. employers of expatriate U.S. 
employees from unpreventable and indefensible Title VII 
claims, (2) avoiding offensive application of U.S. law beyond 
U.S. borders, and (3) forestalling accusations of U.S. cultural 
imperialism. Finally, this Comment briefly considers possible 
legislative reformulations of Title VII's foreign law exception. 
11. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF TITLE VII: EXTRATERRITORIAL 
APPLICATION AND THE FOREIGN LAW EXCEPTION 
To advance the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment,6 to remedy past discrimination on the basis of 
religion, national origin, gender, race, and color, and to discour- 
age future like discrimination in both public life and the pri- 
vate sector, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.' In  passing Title VII, Congress created a federal claim 
against U.S. employers who discriminate in their employment 
policies and practices on the basis of religion, national origin, 
gender, race or color.' 
Title VII recognizes that, under appropriate circumstances, 
religion, national origin, and gender may serve as bona fide 
6. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, 3 1. 
7. 42 U.S.C. $3 2000e-el7 (1988). 
8. Id. In a Title VII action, the claimant files a claim with the Equal Em- 
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Id. $ 2000e-5@). The EEOC is a gov- 
ernmental agency created especially for the purpose of handling employment dis- 
crimination claims. Id. $ 2000e-4. Once the claimant files a claim with the EEOC, 
the EEOC may investigate, facilitate conciliation between claimant and employer 
and, if conciliation fails, litigate the claim on behalf of the claimant. Id. 3 2000e- 
5@). Alternatively, the EEOC can give the claimant a letter declaring the 
claimant's right to sue directly. Id. 2000e-5(f). Potential claimants under Title VII 
may include persons seeking employment by discriminatory employers as well as 
persons already, or at  one time, employed by discriminatory employers. 
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occupational qualifications (BFOQ).' For example, a Mennonite 
church in Central California looking to hire a new pastor may 
discriminate against pastors of other faiths by excluding them 
from the hiring process, if such an exclusion would be "reason- 
ably necessary to the normal operation of that particular. . . 
enterprise."1° But, the Mennonite church could not discrimi- 
nate against, say, an African-American or an  Asian-American 
pastor of the Mennonite faith on BFOQ grounds, since the 
BFOQ exception does not allow discrimination on the basis of 
race or color." And, in  any case, one must remember that the 
BFOQ exception has been integrated as "an extremely narrow 
exception to the general prohibition against dis~rimination."'~ 
Until 1991, whether expatriate U.S. employees of U.S. 
employers were entitled to the protections of Title VII was 
unclear.13 In 1991, however, the Supreme Court held that, 
absent an express legislative statement authorizing Title VII's 
extraterritorial application, Title VII would be limited in scope 
to discrimination occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the  United States.14 This meant, for example, that a U.S. citi- 
zen employed by a U.S. employer and working in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia would not be allowed to recover for his 
employer's religiously motivated employment discrimination.15 
During that same year, however, the express legislative state- 
- - pp - 
9. Id. 8 2000e-2(e) (providing that "it shall not be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer to hire and employ . . . on the basis of his [or her] reli- 
gion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or na- 
tional origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the 
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise"). 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 355 (1977). 
13. See generally Jonathan Turley, T h e n  in Rome": Multinational Misconduct 
and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598 (1990); 
Janelle M. Diller, Note, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Multina- 
tional Enterprise, 73 GEO. L. J. 1465 (1985); Adam M. Mycyk, Comment, United 
States Fair Employment Law in the Transnational Employment Arena: The Case for 
the Extraterritorial Application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 39 
CATH. U. L. REV. 1109 (1990). 
14. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian American Oil Co. 
(ARAMCO), 499 US. 244 (1991). For discussion of this holding see Keith Highet & 
George Kahale 111, International Decision: Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n 
v. Arabian American Oil Co., 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 552 (July 1991); Robert A. 
LaBerge & Thomas G. Eron, Employment Law, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 295, 302 
(1992); Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L. REV. 53, 73-76 (1991); The 
Supreme Court, 1990 Term: Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177, 369-79 (1991). 
15. ARAMCO, 499 U.S. a t  244. 
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ment the Court was looking for but found missing in the 1964 
version of Title VII-a statement indicating Congress' clear 
intent t o  make Title VII applicable abroad-was included in 
the 1991 version of Title VII.16 
Realizing the difficulties Title WI's extraterritorial applica- 
tion might present, Congress provided an exception-the for- 
eign law exception." Congress commanded U.S. employers of 
expatriate U.S employees to comply with Title VII, except when 
compliance would cause the U.S. employer to violate the laws 
of the foreign country in which its U.S. employees work.'' 
Does the foreign law exception, as formulated here, ad- 
dress the kinds of difficulties U.S. employers of expatriate U.S. 
employees faced prior to 1991, i.e., prior to Congress making 
Title VII extraterritorially applicable? As this Comment will 
point out, the foreign law exception apparently ignores at least 
two significant questions U.S. employers of expatriate U.S. 
employees faced prior to 1991: first, whether the U.S. employer 
may, with the blessings of the exception, implement Title VII- 
violative policies or practices in order to prevent U.S. employ- 
ees from themselves breaking the laws of the foreign country in 
which they work;19 and second, whether the foreign law excep- 
tion applies to  a U.S. employer's Title VII-violative policies or 
practices which occur entirely within the territorial boundaries 
of the United States, but which are aimed exclusively at  pre- 
16. 42 U.S.C. 8 2000e(f) (1988 & Supp. 1992) (defining "employee" as a U.S. 
citizen who works "in a foreign country" under the employ of a U.S. employer); see 
also Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Joyner v. 
Monier Roof Tile, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Comerly v. CVN Com- 
panies, 785 F. Supp. 810 (D. Minn. 1992) (each noting that ARAMCO was super- 
seded by the 1991 update to Title VII). 
17. 42 U.S.C. 8 2000e-l(b) (Supp. 1992). 
18. 42 U.S.C. 8 2000e-16) (Supp. 1992) states: 
I t  shall not be unlawful [under the sections of Title VII which regulate 
employment practices] for an employer (or a corporation controlled by an 
employer), labor organization, employment agency or joint labor-manage- 
ment committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining 
(including on-the-job training programs) to take any action otherwise pro- 
hibited by such section, with respect to an employee in a workplace in a 
foreign country if compliance with such section would cause such employ- 
er (or such corporation), such organization, such agency, or such commit- 
tee to violate the law of the foreign country in which such workplace is 
located. 
In other words, if compliance with Title VII would mean that the US. employ- 
er would be in violation of the work-site country's laws, then the U.S. employer is 
excused from compliance with Title VII. Id. 
19. See, e.g., Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983). 
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venting the violation of the laws of the foreign country in  which 
the U.S. employee works or is to be ~tationed.~' A third defi- 
ciency in the foreign law exception, a deficiency perhaps not 
adequately suggested by relevant jurisprudence, is the 
exception's exclusive focus on foreign 'law." Surely, U.S. em- 
ployers require the flexibility to take account of significant non- 
legal factors, such as prevailing culture, morality, andlor tradi- 
tion, when formulating company policy regarding foreign opera- 
tions, especially when these non-legal factors, at least for 
practicle purposes, carry the weight of law.21 
By recourse to three hypotheticals, this Comment will 
analyze the foreign law exception's failure to address these 
three questions. Because all three hypotheticals are factually 
connected with the Kingdom, a brief overview of the law of the 
Kingdom, especially as regards religious commitments and 
discrimination, will at this point prove useful. 
111. THE LAW OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA AND 
RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION:. A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
The Kingdom is, according to its recently promulgated 
Basic S~stern:~ governed by the Shari'a ("the Islamic law"),"( 
20. See, e.g., Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 
1986). 
21. Another deficiency in the foreign law exception, one that will not be fir- 
ther addressed in this Comment, but which nonetheless deserves mention, is the 
exception's failure to limit its scope to discriminatory situations involving only 
religion, national origin or gender. Suffice it to say here, that, for the same rea- 
sons Congress expressly prohibited use of the BFOQ exception in cases involving 
discrimination based race or color, it should probably also have prohibited use of 
the foreign law exception in cases involving discrimination based on race or color. 
22. THE BASIC SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, 
Royal Decree No. A190 (Sha'ban 27, 1412; March 1, 1992) [hereinafter BASIC 
SYSYTEM]; see also Saudi Basic Law of Government Issued, SPA & BBC SUMMARY 
OF WORLD BROADCASTS (British Broadcast Corp. March 3, 1992) available in 
LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, TEXTLINE File. For his interpretations of the Basic 
System, the author relies exclusively on the official Arabic text, generously provid- 
ed to him by the Office of Legal Counsel at the Royal Saudi Embassy in Washing- 
ton, D.C. 
For commentary on the Kingdom's new Basic System see Rashed Aba-Namay, 
The Recent Constitutional Reforms in Saudi Arabia, 42 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 295 
(1993); A. Michael Tarazi, Note, Saudi Arabia's New Basic Laws: me Struggle for 
Participatory Islamic Government, 34 HARV. INTI L.J. 258 (1993). 
23. BASIC SYSTEM arts. 8 & 23. The Shari'a encompasses an extremely broad 
range of legal topics-family, property, personal injury, and criminal law, to name 
but a few. While the content of the Shari'a is relatively predictable in some mat- 
ters, a more profound analysis shows that the Shari'a is a process, a jurispruden- 
tial methodology developed during the Middle Ages and intended, not as a defm- 
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a law deduced some eleven centuries ago from the Holy Qur'an 
and the sunna ("tradition") of the Prophet Muham~ned~~ 
( p b ~ h ) . ~ ~  
We sent down to you the Book which possesses the Truth so 
that you could judge between people according to that which 
Allah has shown you . . . .26 
No, by your Lord, they believe not until they make you 
[Muhammed (pbuh)] judge in all disputes that arise between 
them and find no resistance in their souls against your judg- 
ments, accepting them ~ h o l e h e a r t e d l ~ . ~ ~  
itive list of offenses, but as a guide to al-Qadi ("the judge") in the determination of 
legal questions. The Shari'a is not a code of offenses. It does not concern itself 
with stare decisis. See David J. Karl, Note, Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia: What the 
Foreign Attorney Should Know, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 131 (1991) 
(discussing the Shari'a process as applied in the Kingdom). The Shari'a is much 
less tangible than a civil code or common law-stare decisis legal regime. 
24. There are five recognized primary sources of Shari'a. They are known as 
usul al-fiqh ("origins of understanding" or "of jurisprudence"). They include: (1) the 
Holy Qur'an, the literal word of Allah as revealed to Muhammed (pbuh) which is, 
therefore, the highest and most authoritative source of law; (2) the sunna of the 
Prophet (pbuh), which includes huda'ith ("sayingsm)-which vary widely in authen- 
ticity and, therefore, in authority-about the life of the Prophet (pbuh); (3) al-ijma' 
("the consensus" of the Muslim nation), a source of law which, it is said, if based 
on true unity, c a ~ o t  error; (4) al-qiyas ("the analogy")-an analogue method of 
deriving legal theories from the above sources; and, finally, (5) al-ijtihud ("the 
striving" or "the endeavor"), a struggle for understanding in accordance with the 
first three sources. It is, of course, beyond the scope of this Comment to say much 
more than this about these sources of the Shari'a. For a more dtetailed account of 
Shari'a sources see generally ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC 
REFORMATION (1990); S.H. AMIN, MIDDLE EAST LEGAL SYSTEMS 325-27 (1985); N.J. 
COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW (1964); THE ISLAMIC RIMINAL JUSTICE SYS- 
TEM (bf. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1982); ISLAMIC LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE (Nicholas 
Heer ed., 1990); ISLAMIC LAW: SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXTS (Aziz Al-Azmeh 
ed., 1989); MATTHEW LIPPMAN ET AL., ISLAMIC CRIMINAL AW AND PROCEDURE: AN 
INTRODUCTION (1988). 
25. "Pbuh" is an abbreviated form of the Arabic invocation sala allahi 'alai he 
wa sallim, meaning "may Allah's peace and prayers be upon him." To the ear of 
the Muslim, it is a sign of irreverence to mention the name of the Prophet 
Muhammed (pbuh) or that of any of the other holy men of the Judeo-Christian 
tradition (pbut) without uttering this invocation. This Comment will offer this invo- 
cation wherever appropriate both as a sign of reverence for the Prophet (pbuh) and 
as an expression of respect for Muslim etiquette. 
26. HOLY QUR'AN 4:105. All quotations from the Holy Qur'an are based on 
the author's own translation. For alternative translations, see THE HOLY QUR'AN: 
TEXT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY ('Abdullah Yusuf 'Ali, trans. 1989); THE 
QUR'AN (Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, trans. 1991). While these texts provide alter- 
native translations, it must be noted that the only authentic language for Qur'anic 
interpretation and discourse is, of course, Arabic. 
27. HOLY QUR'AN 4:65. 
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The Shari'a may properly be understood as being generally 
geared to discriminate on the basis of religion. Under it, there 
are Muslims and there are non-Muslims; the former are to be 
prefemed and the latter tolerated, but only if submissive to 
Islamic rule and custom.28 More specifically, under the Shari'a 
t h e r e  a r e  non-Musl ims  who a r e  "People of t h e  
B~ok"~~-Christians and Jews-and there are non-Muslims 
who are "People of the Fire"30-atheists, pagans, and idolaters 
(or all non-Muslims who are not either Christians or J e ~ s ) . ~ '  
Again, the Holy Qur'an prefers submissive People of the Book 
to submissive People of the Fire.32 In short, and in contradis- 
28. From the first days of the Islamic Revelation some thirteen centuries ago, 
Muslims have faced the question of how to treat the unbelievers living in their 
midst. In response to this question, the Prophet Muhammed (pbuh) directed Mus- 
lims to 
[flight those among the People of the Book who do not believe in Allah, 
[who do not believe] in the Last Day, who do not forsake what Allah and 
His Prophet forbid, and who do not abide in the True Religion . . . until 
such a time as they submissively render the jizyah. 
HOLY QUR'AN 9:29. The jizyah was a poll tax that non-converting Christians and 
Jews paid in token of their willing submission to Islamic rule and custom. See 
&BEE~T HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES 35, 134, 139-40, 217-218 
(1992) (noting that, whereas Muslims paid no regular taxes, non-converting Chris- 
tians and Jews were made to pay a poll tax-jizyah-from the earliest days of the 
spread of Islam). Christians and Jews who not only failed to convert to Islam, but 
who also failed to submit to Islamic rule and custom by willingly paying the jizyah 
were to be treated as enemies. 
In more recent times, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, "a sovereign Arab Islamic 
state," has asked itself the same question-how properly to treat the unbelievers 
within its borders. BASIC SYSTEM art. 1. Following the cue of the Prophet, the 
Kingdom takes the approach of treating unbelievers within its boarders with kind- 
ness and justice, so long as they submit to Islamic rule and custom; for "Allah 
does not forbid you from treating with kindness and justice those who do not fight 
with you over religion . . . for Allah loves those who are just." HOLY QUR'AN 60:8. 
This is not to say that the unbeliever who refuses to submit to Islamic rule and 
custom will be treated unkindly or with injustice while in the Kingdom (although 
some reports indicate the contrary). The disrespectful unbeliever, the unbeliever 
who fails to abide by the Kingdom's Islamic laws or who fails to observe the Is- 
lamic values of Saudi society, will be invited to leave. See, BASIC SYSTEM art. 41 
(requiring non-citizen residents to abide the laws, observe the values, and respect 
the traditions of Islamic Saudi society). 
29. HOLY QUR'AN 5:12-18. 
30. See, e.g., HOLY QUR'AN 9:113 (defining "People of the Fire"). 
31. HOLY QUR'AN 5:82 (informing the Muslim that "[ylou will find that the 
strongest in enmity towards those who have believed are Jews and idolaters, also, 
you will find that closest to those who have believed are Christians, among whom 
are learned and pious persons who are not arrogant"). ' 
32. HOLY QUR'AN 9:3-4. In practice, and for regional, geo-political, and histori- 
cal reasons, the Kingdom has made a point of discriminating against Jews even 
though they are People of the Book. If the Israeli-Palestinian peace process suc- 
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tinction to the purposes of Title VII, the Holy Qur'an expressly 
identifies discrimination on the basis of religion as a divine 
commandment. "Oh you who believe, take not in except your 
own kind; for [the unbelievers] will spare nothing to corrupt 
you. They wish for your destruction. The aspersions of their 
mouths [against you] have already been manifest and what is 
yet hidden in their bosoms is worse still . . . ."33 The Kingdom 
strictly obeys this ~ommandment .~~ 
ceeds, this kind of discrimination may begin slowly to subside. Already, the King- 
dom has begun, albeit very cautiously, to pay less attention to the restrictions of 
the Arab Boycott and tentatively to explore business and investment possibilities 
with Israeli entities. Generally speaking, Jews are not presently allowed to travel 
or to work in the Kingdom. 
33. HOLY QUR'AN 3:118-9. 
34. For example, the Kingdom is not a signatory to the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Resolutions, part 1, 
at  71, U.N. Doc. N810 (1948). Nor is the Kingdom a signatory to the 1981 U.N. 
Declaration on the Elimination of All forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36 Sess., Supp. No. 51, 
at  171, U.N. Doc. N36151 (1981). Nor is the Kingdom a party to any of the several 
international agreements a ~ o u n c i n g  religious liberty or prohibiting religiously 
motivated discrimination. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The Kingdom is not ashamed of this fact, 
but feels instead that it has faithfully pursued the course most consistent with its 
constitution-i.e., the Holy Qur'an and the sunna of the Prophet (pbuh). The King- 
dom has refrained from signing or ratifying these agreements, because they are not 
in accordance with Shari'a mandates, e.g., limiting the freedom of religion. A dis- 
cussion of some of these limitations accompanies the hypotheticals in the text be- 
low. See, e-g., Abdul Wahab Bashir & Khaled Al-Suhail, Saudi Arabia: Shuri'a Pro- 
tects Society and Human Rights, Naseef Says, MONEYCLIPS & ARAB NEWS (August 
2, 1993) available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS-C database (discussing how the Con- 
sultative Assembly's Deputy Minister defends the Kingdom's Islamic stance on and 
record in the area of universal human rights); Islam Guarantees Human Rights, 
Says Saud, MONEYCLIPS & THE RIYADH DAILY (June 17, 1993) avalailable in 
LEMS, NEXIS Library, WIRES File (giving full text of Saudi Foreign Minister 
Saud Al-Faisal's speech to the World Conference on Human Rights, a conference 
which concluded in June, 1993); Dubai: Saudi Arabia Criticizes Western Media, 
REUTER TEXTLINE (May 24, 1993) available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, WIRES file 
(covering Saudi Interior Minister Nayf Ibn Abd Al-Aziz's defense of the Kingdom's 
human rights record, a defense which came on the heels of attacks on the King- 
dom in the Western media); Dubai: Saudi Arabia Denies Human Rights Abuses, 
REUTER TEXTLINE (May 15, 1993) available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, WIRES File 
(covering Saudi Interior Minister Nayf Ibn Abd Al-Aziz's denial of, inter alia, U.S. 
State Department allegations of pervasive human rights violations); cf: Charles 
Condemns Iraq, Calls for Understanding of Islam, REUTER NEWSWIRE (October 27, 
1993) available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, WIRES File (covering Prince Charles' 
call for tolerance and understanding of Islamic faith and culture); Mustafa 
Mahmoud, A Campaign Against Islam, MONEYCLIPS & AL-AHRAM WEEKLY (Novem- 
ber 4, 1993) available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, WIRES File (claiming that the 
West, headed by the United States, is religiously using democratic and human 
rights rhetoric to undermine Islam). 
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One example of the extent to which the Kingdom is com- 
mitted to Islam (literally to "submission" or "surrender" to the 
will of Allah) and to the Islamic Shari'a, which expressly pre- 
scribes discrimination on the basis of religion, is the Kingdom's 
Basic System. By way of comparison to Title VIrs stance 
against religious discrimination, the Kingdom's Basic System 
indicates a legal preference for Islamic doctrine, customs, and 
values as well as for persons of Islamic faith. No fewer than 28 
of 83 total articles in the Kingdom's Basic System express devo- 
tion and duty to Islam, its doctrines, practices, holy texts, and 
All of this is not to say that the Kingdom is not committed to human rights. 
The Kingdom is committed to human rights as understood in Islamic doctrine. 
BASIC SYSTEM, art. 26. As examples of the Kingdom's commitment to human 
rights, consider the following. The Kingdom grants political asylum in cases re- 
quired to serve the public interests. Id. art. 42. The Kingdom prohibits unlawfid 
searches and invasions of privacy, including offrcial entry into the home without 
owner's consent or other statutory authority. Id. art. 37. The Kingdom limits con- 
fiscation, delay, reading, or listening to telegraphic, telephonic, postal and other 
communications to cases specified in the regulations. Id. art. 40. The Kingdom 
prohibits incommunicado and other forms of unlawful detention. Id. art. 36. The 
Kingdom prohibits ex post facto criminal provisions and prosecution of crimes not 
catalogued either in the Shari'a or in the regulations. Id. The Kingdom recognizes 
the rights of all individuals, whether citizens of or residents in the Kingdom, to 
address their public authorities, including the King and the Crown Prince. Id. art. 
43. The Kingdom recognizes the rights of all individuals to litigate their claims in 
the courts of the Kingdom. Id. art. 47. The Kingdom recognizes freedom of the 
press ('free speech in the media'), except as limited by: express regulatory require- 
ments; the precept of kalima tayyiba ("courteous word"); and the expectation that 
the media contribute to the education of the Ummah ("nation," meaning the Is- 
lamic nation) and bolstering of the Ummah's unity. Id. art. 39 (further stating that 
"[all1 acts [presumably by the media] that invite sedition or division or that are 
harmful to state security and public relations or that take away from the dignity 
and rights of man are forbidden"). Finally, the Kingdom recognizes the positive 
rights of citizens to health care, public education, work, and, in cases of emergen- 
cy, illness, or disability, to social security. Id. arts. 31, 30, 28 & 27. 
The Kingdom has long been a supporter of the Arab League's several efforts to 
formulate an Arab expression of human rights. A. H. ROBERTSON & J. G. 
MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 196-200 (3d ed. 1992). In the past, 
the Arab League's efforts to formulate such an expression have focused largely on 
Israeli human rights abuses in the Levant. More recently, the Kingdom has con- 
cerned itself with human rights abuses committed by non-Muslims against Muslims 
in Hebron, Kashmir and war-torn Bosnia-Herzegovina. Should the Kingdom ever 
ratify an international or regional human rights accord, the Basic System would 
commit the Kingdom to abide thereby. BASIC SYSTEM art. 81. 
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Sha~-i 'a.~~ For illustrative purposes, a brief overview of these 
35. Another example of the Kingdom's profound commitment to Islam and the 
Islamic Shari'a may be observed in the several Islamic limitations placed on gov- 
ernmental power. According to its recently promulgated Basic System, the Kingdom 
is an Islamic monarchy. BASIC SYSTEM arts. 1, 5-8, 44; see also AMIN, supra note 
24; Jeanne Asherman, Doing Business in Saudi Arabia: The Contemporary Applica- 
tion of Islamic Law, 16 INT'L L. 321 (1982). 
From the earliest days of its establishment, the power to govern the Kingdom- 
has been and continues to be vested in the King, the Protector of the Faith, the 
Imam, the Keeper of the Two Holy Shrines. AMIN, supra note 24; Aba-Namay, 
supra note 22; Tarazi, supra note 22; Karl, supra note 23. 
The King is the origin of judicial, executive and regulatory power in the King- 
dom. BASIC SYSTEM art. 44. The King is also commander-in-chief of the Kingdom's 
armed forces and, as such, has the power to declare states of emergency, general 
mobilizations and war. Id. arts. 55, 60 & 61. Also, the King has the power to take 
and to prolong "urgent measures" when the safety or territorial integrity of the 
Kingdom is threatened, or when the security or other interests of its people are a t  
risk. Id. art. 62. 
The King's power to govern is limited in just one important respect: the King 
does not and cannot make law; for, there is but one Lawmaker, and Muhammed 
(pbuh) is His Prophet. See HOLY QUR'AN 7:54 (stating that "[ilt was your Lord God 
who created the heavens and the earth in six days and then established Himself 
on the throne. [It was He that] covered the day in night, and caused the day to 
follow night quickly. The sun, the moon and the stars are subject to His command. 
Is it not His place to create and to command? Blessed be Allah, the Lord of the 
Worlds." (emphasis added)); see also Karl supra note 23; Peter D. Sloane, The 
Status of Islamic Law in the Modern Commercial World, 22 INT'L LAW 743, 751-2 
(1988). This proposition rules out the need for a legislature, since law-making is 
not for mortals, but is exercised only by the Divine. 
The King may make whatever regulations are necessary to govern the Kingdom 
effectively. BASIC SYSTEM art. 55. In practice, these regulations have the force of 
law, but the King's ability to make regulation is limited. Under Islamic jurispru- 
dence, human activity falls into five basic categories: (1) activity which Holy Writ 
expressly commands or requires; (2) activity about which Holy Writ expresses some 
preference or recommendation; (3) activity about which Holy Writ is silent or indif- 
ferent; (4) activity about which Holy Writ expresses some aversion or reprobation; 
and (5) activity which Holy Writ expressly forbids. The King's ability to regulate 
human activity is generally understood to be limited to the third category. Fortu- 
nately for the King, many of the contemporary regulatory concerns of the Kingdom 
(e.g., admiralty law, commerce and company law, oil and gas law, mining law, 
immigration and naturalization law, tax law, and environmental law) fall largely 
into this category. 
If the King makes regulation contrary to divine law, as expressed in the Holy 
Qur'an and the sunna ("tradition") of the Prophet (pbuh) or in other specified Is- 
lamic jurisprudential texts, then such regulation is not enforceable. AMIN, supra 
note 24, at  312-3 (citing the Royal Constitutional Decree, art. 6 (1926)); see BASIC 
SYSTEM arts. 7-8, 23, 25 (illustrating the constraint placed on the King's rule by 
Islamic law). This discussion illustrates why it may be proper to think of the 
Kingdom's system of government as an absolute monarchy. The true sovereign is 
Allah, the Absolute Ruler of the Universe; the temporal King is Allah's vicegerent 
on earth. Such reasoning rings true in Qur'anic verse. HOLY QUR'AN 42:49 (declar- 
ing that "[tlo Allah does the sovereignty belong, both in the heavens and on 
earth"); id. 3:26 (commanding the faithful: "Declare this: 'Oh Allah, Lord of Power, 
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28 articles is provided below. 
The Basic System identifies "the Book of Allah," that is, 
the Holy Qur'an, and the sunna of the Prophet (pbuh) as the 
Kingdom's constituti~n.~~ The Basic System declares that the 
power to govern arises from the and the sunna of the Prophet 
(pbuh)?' The three bases of government in the Kingdom are 
justice, consultation, and equality as understood in the 
Sha~-i 'a .~~ The Kingdom assumes the duty of applying the 
Shari'a, of ordering that which is good, of forbidding that which 
is ab~minable?~ 
The Basic System declares the Saudi judiciary40 complete- 
you give the power [to govern] to whomsoever you will and wrest that power from 
whomsoever you will; you honor those who it is your pleasure to honor and humili- 
ate those who it is your pleasure to humiliate. Indeed, over all do you have 
power'"); id. 2:30 (instructing the believer: "Behold, your Lord declared to the an- 
gels: 'I will provide a vicegerent on earth' "); id. 38:26 (reminding all that "[tlhen 
did we say, 'David, we make you vicegerent in the land: rule then with justice and 
succumb not to lusts'"). 
The specified Islamic jurisprudential texts which bind the King, in addition to 
the Holy Qur'an and sunna of the Prophet @buh) are: THE COMMENTARIES AD- 
DALIL; THE COMMENTARIES OF AZ-ZAD; AL-BAHUTI, MANSUR IBN YUNUS IBN IDRIS 
AL-HANBALI (ca. 1641 C.E.), KASHSHAF AL-QINA AN MATN AL-IKNA; AL-BAHUTI, 
MANSUR IBN YUNUS IBN IDRIS AL-HANBALI (ca. 1641 C.E.), SI-IARH MUTAHA AL- 
IDARAT; and IBN QUDAMA L-MAQDISI, MUWAFFAQADDIN ABU MUHAMMED 'ABDULLAH 
BIN AHMED BIN MUHAMMED (ca. 1223 C.E.), AL-MUGHNI, 10 vol. (Cairo, 1970 C.E.). 
If the Holy Qur'an, the sunnu of the Prophet (pbuh), or all of these five texts 
fail to give a clear legal answer, then the King and the courts may recur to other 
specified Hanbali legal manuals and to  the authorities of the other three main 
schools of Sunni jurisprudence. AMIN, supra note 24, at  312-3 (citing the Royal 
Constitutional Decree, art. 6 (1926)). In cases of sufficient extremity, if the King 
steps outside the strictures of Islamic law when making regulations, the King may 
be deposed. Asherman, supra note 35, at 324; see BASIC SYSTEM arts. 7 & 8 (de- 
claring the basis and source of governmental power and legitimacy in the Kingdom 
to be the Holy Qur'an, the sunna of the Prophet, and Islamic Shari'a and implying 
that governmental acts or decisions contrary to these undermine governmental 
authority and legitimacy). 
36. BASIC SYSTEM art. 1. 
37. Id. art. 7. 
38. Id. art. 8. 
39. Id. art. 23. 
40. Disquisition on the subject of the Kingdom's judiciary is beyond the scope 
of this paper. The following sketch of the Kingdom's judiciary may nonetheless be 
helpful in further illustrating the pervasive effect Islam has on the Kingdom. For 
disquisition, see AMIN, supra note 24; Karl, supm note 23; Mark Jones, Islamic 
Law in Saudi Arabia: A Responsive View, 16 INT'L J. COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. 
JUST., No. I., 43-56 (Spring 1992); Richard N. Merenbach, Religious Law and Reli- 
gious Freedom in Saudi Arabia and Israel: A Comparative Study, 12 HASTINGS 
INYL & COMP. L. REV. 235-60 (1988); Richter H. Moore, Courts, Law, Justice, And 
Criminal Trials in Saudi Arabia, 11 INT'L J. COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST., No. I., 
61-7 (Spring 1992). 
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The Kingdom, as prescribed by the Ministry of Justice, has a three-tiered, 
inquisitorial arrangement of courts, composed of Shari'a courts, appellate Shari'a 
courts and a Supreme Judicial Council. Judges at all levels in this three-tiered 
arrangement are "independent" in their rulings, findings, etc., except as limited by 
the Shari'a and applicable Shari'a-consistent regulations. Judges in the Kingdom 
don't make law. The law exists objectively. It is decreed from on high. Judges 
must confine themselves to the law as already decreed. Innovation is sorely 
frowned upon. 
The Kingdom's "independent" judiciary is indirectly appointed by, and answer- 
able ultimately, to the king. BASIC SYSTEM arts. 46, 50-52, 55. Upon completion of 
traditional Islamic training, selected applicants for judicial appointments receive 
three additional years of legal training a t  the Ministry of Justice's Higher Judicial 
Institute in Riyadh. 
There is no provision in Shari'a law for trial by jury. There is no official or 
regularly published case reporter in the Kingdom. By U.S. standards, the 
Kingdom's judiciary provedes a somewhat scant set of general procedural rules. 
Individual Shari'a courts do not publish local procedural rules. One reason a more 
technical set of procedural rules might be less desirable is that traditionally all 
litigants (except those, for example, who do not speak Arabic) represent themselves 
personally, sometimes through a respected relative (usually a non-lawyer). Any 
overly technical set of procedural rules could upset the Shari'a preference for self- 
representation. Such a set of procedural rules could also disturb the substantive 
concerns of the Shari'a. 
The substantive rigors of the Shari'a apply to citizens of the King- 
dom-Muslims-as well as to non-citizen subjects of the Kingdom, whether Muslim 
or non-Muslim. 
The Shari'a courts are divided into courts of limited jurisdiction and courts of 
general jurisdiction, the distinction being largely based on the gravity of offense or 
the amount in controversy. For example, a Shari'a court of limited jurisdiction can 
take cases involving the relatively minor Shari'a offense of intoxication (the punish- 
ment for which is flogging), but it may not hear cases calling for capital punish- 
ment or dismemberment. Such cases fall within the jurisdiction of Shari'a courts of 
general jurisdiction. The Shari'a court is usually presided over by a single judge. 
However, in cases calling for capital punishment or dismemberment, a three-judge 
panel is required. 
The Shari'a appellate court has jurisdiction of appeals brought within 15 days 
of final judgment and of any and all issues raised on appeal, regardless of whether 
those issues were raised in the Shari'a court. The Shari'a appellate court can sum- 
mon new witnesses and has mandatory jurisdiction of appeals from decisions call- 
ing for capital punishment or dismemberment. The Shari'a appellate court may 
remand cases to Shari'a courts for retrial. I t  may not, however, reverse Shari'a 
court rulings or findings. A Shari'a court may refuse to rehear a remanded case or 
to  alter its ruling or finding. In this case, the Shari'a appellate court may vacate 
the recalcitrant Shari'a court's rulings or findings and send the case before another 
Shari'a court for retrial. The Shari'a appellate court is usually presided over by a 
three-judge panel. However, a five-judge panel is necessary in order to invoke capi- 
tal punishment or dismemberment. In the most serious instances, the Shari'a ap- 
pellate court may choose to hear an appeal en banc. When this happens, the Su- 
preme Judicial Council cannot review the Shari'a appellate court's decision. 
The Supreme Judicial Council is the highest authority in the Kingdom's Shari'a 
court system. The council is composed of a chairman, who holds the rank of minis- 
ter, and ten members. This council reviews sentences involving capital punishment 
or dismemberment. However, the council is not a court per se. If it disagrees with 
a judgment of the Shari'a court of appeals, it merely refers judgment back to the 
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ly independent in its judgments, except with respect to the de- 
mands of the Shari'a." The courts must apply the Shari'a in 
accordance with the Holy Qur'an and the sunna of the Prophet 
(pbuh)P2 The source of fatwa ("formal legal opinion") is the 
Holy Qur'an and the sunna of the Prophet @ b ~ h ) . ~ ~  The 
courts must give force to the King's decrees, so long as those 
decrees are consistent with the Holy Qur'an and the sunna of 
the Prophet @ b ~ h ) . ~ ~  
According to the Basic System, the King carries out poli- 
cies consistent with the judgments of Islam and oversees the 
application of the Shz~ri'a.~~ The King's ministers are also re- 
sponsible for the implementation the Sha15'a.~~ The regulatory 
power must be used to pursue the best interests of the 
Kingdom in accordance with the Sha15'a.~' 
Under the Basic System, the Kingdom protects human 
rights in conformity with the Sh~wi'a.~~ For example, no crime 
Shari'a court of appeals for another hearing. The council administers the affairs of 
the Shari'a court system and also addresses in fatawa ("formal legal opinions") any 
questions of Shari'a law put to it by the King or the Minister of Justice. 
A party to an action in any Shari'a court may approach the King uis a uis his 
open door policy and petition for royal clemency, pardon or intervention. In a 
sense, this makes the King's court the court of last resort in the Shari'a court 
system. 
In addition to the Shari'a court system and in response to the demands of 
large-scale internal modernization, a sizeable foreign workforce, and voluminous 
international complex commercial transactions, tribunals of special expertise have 
been established. These specialized tribunals are referred to as the administrative 
courts. They include the likes of a Board of Grievances to hear claims to which the 
Kingdom is a party, an International Center for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, a Commission for the Settlement of the Commercial Disputes of Com- 
panies, and a multi-tiered Committee for the Settlement of Labor Disputes. These 
administrative courts tend to have published, formal procedures. Given the formali- 
ties adhered to in these courts, it generally takes much longer for cases to clear 
the docket than is true in the Shari'a court system. A well-regulated system of 
voluntary arbitration is also available in the Kingdom as a vehicle for solving 
commercial disputes. 
In the more remote parts of the Kingdom, many of the structures described 
above are not readily available. In such places, local umara' ("princes"), in addition 
to their municipal functions, act as judges in common disputes. 
41. Id. art. 46. 
42. Id. art. 48. 
43. Id. art. 45. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. art. 55. 
46. Id. art. 57. 
47. Id. art. 67. 
48. Id. art. 26. 
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may be charged, neither may punishment be assessed in the 
absence of either Shari'a or other statutory a~thority.~' 
The Kingdom, under the Basic System, assumes the duty 
of protecting "the Islamic doctrine" and of undertaking to fur- 
ther the da'wa ("missionary call") to  Allah.5' The Kingdom 
must maintain "Islamic values."51 The Kingdom's society is 
said "to cling to the strength of Allah" and to cooperate in 
bringing about al-birr ("piety").52 The Kingdom is to protect 
Islamic heritage and contribute to  Islamic civilizati~n.~~ To 
this end, education in the Kingdom aims at teaching the Is- 
lamic doctrine to the 
Under the Basic System, the family is the foundation of 
Saudi society, a society in which family members are to  be 
raised on the basis of the Islamic doctrine, and in faith and 
obedience to Allah and the Prophet @ b ~ h ) . ~ ~  The Basic Sys- 
tem charges every citizen of the Kingdom with the duty of de- 
fending the Islamic doctrine? 
The Kingdom, as dictated by the Basic System, works 
towards the fulfillment of the hopes of the Islamic Unmah 
("nation"-comprised of all Muslims every~here).~' The King- 
dom takes upon itself the duty of edifying and serving the Two 
Holy Shrines-located at Mecca and Medina-and of providing 
safety and care during the Hajj ("~ilgrimage").~~ The Kingdom 
raises and equips the military forces with a view t o  defending 
the Islamic doctrine, the Two Holy Shrines:' the society and 
the homeland?' 
The Basic System states that the right to  succeed t o  the 
throne belongs to the aslah ("most righteous" or "most suit- 
able") of the descendants of King Abd Al-Aziz Ibn Abd Ar- 
Rahman Al-Faisal Al  Saud?' Determining which of the ap- 
proximately 500 eligible descendants is the aslah must be ac- 
49. Id. art. 38. 
50. Id. art. 23. 
51. Id. art. 10. 
52. Id. art. 11. 
53. Id. art. 29. 
54. Id. art. 13. 
55. Id. art. 9. 
56. Id. art. 34. 
57. Id. art. 25. 
58. Id. art. 24. 
59. HOLY QUR'AN 9:28. 
60. BASIC SYSTEM art. 33. 
61. Id. art. 5. 
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complished in light of the teachings of the Holy Qur'an and the 
sunna of the Prophet ( p b ~ h ) . ~ ~  The citizen's duty of allegiance 
to the King is to be understood by reference to the Holy Qur'an 
and the sunna of the Prophet ( p b ~ h ) . ~ ~  
The Basic System attributes the wealth of the Kingdom to 
Allah.'* Property, capital, and 'aml ("work" or "labor") are per- 
sonal rights which serve social ends under the Sha15'a.~~ Un- 
der the Basic System, every citizen must pay zikat, a special, 
religiously mandated form of "alms," and the Kingdom must 
then distribute the monies collected as zikat in an appropriate 
manner? 
The Basic System identifies the Hegira calendar, a lunar 
calendar which began July 16, 622 C.E. when the Prophet 
(pbuh) took flight from Mecca t o  Medina, as the Kingdom's 
official ~alendar.~' The two highest Muslim holidays, 'Aid al- 
Fitr (the breakfast feast which follows the month-long fast of 
Ramadan) and 'Aid al-Adha (the day of sacrifice, a feast follow- 
ing the breakfast feast by about three months) are the official 
state  holiday^.^' The Basic System describes the Kingdom's 
flag as a green field, a color reserved in the Muslim world ex- 
clusively for the descendants of the Prophet; upon that green 
field are the words, la ilaha ila Allah wa Muhamrned rusul 
62. Id. Each of the approximately 500 sons and grandsons of the Kingdom's 
founder, King Abd Al-Aziz Ibn Abd Ar-Rahman Al-Faisal A1 Saud, is a potential 
heir to the throne. Id. When the present ruler, King Fahd Ibn Abd Al-Aziz A1 
Saud, passes away, the 500 or so potential heirs will convene something resem- 
bling an electoral college. Id. arts. 503) & (e) (the phrase "the act of allegiance" 
apparently refers to the traditional electoral college process). From that electoral 
college one of the many potential heirs will emerge as the new king. The Crown 
Prince, the King's hand chosen heir apparent, does not necessarily emerge from the 
electoral college as the new king. Id. art. 5(c). In fact, the role of the Crown 
Prince, with respect to succession, is to serve as an interim king until such a time 
as the electoral college reaches its decision regarding who will succeed to  the 
throne. Id. art. 5(e). Of course, whoever happens to be Crown Prince at  the time of 
the present king's death would arguably be in a stronger position than most other 
would-be successors. This would be true for two reasons. First, the electoral college 
will feel some sense of respect for or loyalty to the decedent King's Crown Prince 
selection. Second, the Crown Pr inchter im King will have the powers and favors 
of state at his disposal at  the time the electoral college is making its decision. 
63. Id. art. 6. 
64. Id. art. 14. 
65. Id. art. 17. 
66. Id. art. 21. 
67. Id. art. 2. There are only 354 days in each lunar year of the Hegira cal- 
endar; which translates to approximately 103 Anno Hegira. years to every solar 
(Gregorian) century. 
68. Id. 
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Allah ("There is no god but Allah, and Muhammed is his 
Pr~phet !" ) .~~  
As this brief overview of the Basic System indicates, the 
Kingdom may be best understood in terms of a theocracy in  
which there is but one Lawgiver-Muhammed (pbuh) is His 
Prohphet." The Shari'a, the divinely dictated law governs in 
the vast majority of cases. The King, as temporal ruler, makes 
regulations (amr or nizam), which regulations are not enforce- 
able if inconsistent with the Shari'a. The King is subordinate to 
the supreme will of Allah. Both King and Kingdom are Muslim, 
"submissive." Both King and Kingdom have "surrendered" to 
the Most Merciful, the Most Benevolent. I t  may be safely as- 
serted that the Kingdom is committed to Islam in a way suffi- 
cient to dispose it to discrimination on the basis of religion. 
IV. THREE HYPOTHETICALS ILLUSTRATING THE INADEQUACIES 
OF THE FOREIGN LAW EXCEPTION 
A. May a U.S. Employer Invoke the Foreign Law Exception 
to Prevent a U.S. Employee Working Abroad 
from Violating Foreign Law ? 
Suppose that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia contracts with 
a U.S. helicopter company to provide support to the Kingdom 
in connection with the yearly religious pilgrimage of millions of 
Muslims to Islam's Two Holy Shrines a t  Mecca and Medina.?' 
According to the contract, the helicopter company's will have 
two primary missions: first, to provide general pilgrimage route 
surveillance; second, to assist in fighting the periodic tent fires 
that erupt along the pilgrimage route.72 
In order to get the job done right, the company sets up 
operational centers in three key Saudi cities-the capitol city of 
Riyadh, the Arab Gulf city of Dhahran, and the Red Sea city of 
Jedda. Each of these operational centers will service a length of 
the pilgrimage route. Only the operational center in Jedda will 
69. Id. art. 3. This expression, known commonly as the shahadu or "testimo- 
ny," is the first of the Five Pillars of Islam, and is the one confession required of 
every Muslim. 
70. See COULSON, supra note 24, at 9-20 (describing the concept of Islamic 
legislation and lawmaking). 
71. This hypothetical is based loosely on Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. 
Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983). 
72. The pilgrims-many of whom are city folk-sometimes build fires too close 
to their tents, occasionally resulting in tent fires. 
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service sections of the pilgrimage route located within the area 
of the Two Holy Shrines. This is important, because the area of 
the Two Holy Shrines is haram (forbidden) for non-Muslims. 
Non-Muslims who trespass the haram of the Two Holy Shrines 
commit capital trespass, that is, trespass punishable by be- 
heading. 
In  order to prevent its pilots (most of whom are non-Mus- 
lim, U.S. citizens) from themselves trespassing the haram of the 
Two Holy Shrines, the helicopter company adopts an ostensibly 
Title VII-violative policy of requiring pilots in its Jeddah office 
to be Muslims or, if not already Muslims, to convert to Islam. 
The reasons for adopting this policy seem obvious enough: to 
avoid risking the heads of its pilots and to avoid annoying royal 
sensitivities or irritating the Muslim community. But, despite 
these reasons, the company cannot say that Saudi law requires 
the adoption of such a policy. For, in fact, it does not. The heli- 
copter company would not itself break any Saudi law by declin- 
ing to adopt such a policy for Title VII  reason^.'^ Nonetheless, 
the helicopter company adopts the policy, thereby raising this 
question: does the foreign law exception apply to the helicopter 
company's Title VII-violative Islamic conversion policy, even 
though the helicopter company would itself violate no foreign 
law by declining to adopt that policy? Or, more abstractly, may 
a U.S. employer implement Title VII-violative policies or prac- 
tices with the blessing of the foreign law exception in order to 
prevent its U.S. employees from themselves breaking the laws 
of the foreign country in which they work, even when the U.S. 
employer would not itself be in violation of the foreign country's 
laws by declining to adopt such policies or practices? 
Looking at Title VII's plain language-non-compliance with 
Title VII is lawful, if compliance would cause the U.S. employer 
to break the laws of the foreign country in which the U.S. em- 
ployee ~ o r k s ~ ~ - i t  appears that the foreign law exception does 
not apply to the helicopter company's Title VII-violative conver- 
sion policy. For if the company complies with Title VII by re- 
fraining from adopting the religiously discriminatory policy, it 
73. In Dynalectron, 577 F. Supp. at 1196, the facts were as described above, 
when Mr. Wade Kern, a Christian of the Baptist denomination, contracted (albeit 
indirectly) to fly helicopters for Dynalectron in the Kingdom. Mr. Kern's assign- 
ment was to the Jeddah office. In order to start work there, company policy re- 
quired that he convert to Islam. When he refused to convert, however, he was sent 
back to the United States. No conversion to Islam meant no job. 
74. 42 U.S.C. 3 2000e-l(b) (Supp. 1992). 
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does not itself violate the laws of the Kingdom. Additionally, a 
prospective violation of the foreign country's law, in this case 
violation of the law of the Kingdom, is what the foreign law 
exception expressly requires. If the helicopter company, instead 
of adopting the religiously discriminatory Islamic conversion 
policy, were to comply with the religious nondiscrimination 
requirements of Title VII, it would merely be leaving open the 
possibility that one of its U.S. employees (specifically, one of its 
non-Muslim pilots working out of the Jedda office) could unlaw- 
fully fly over Islam's Two Holiest Shrines, thereby committing 
capital trespass. But why shouldn't the helicopter company be 
allowed to take some measures, even if religiously discrimina- 
tory, to prevent the potential disaster of sending home the 
beheaded remains of an haram-trespassing pilot? 
Assuming it desires to perform its contract with the King- 
dom, the helicopter company has two alternatives at this juno 
ture. First, it could argue that the foreign law exception ap- 
plies. I t  could make a good faith, albeit risky, argument that  
because of the intimate relationship between the company's 
enterprise (servicing the Two Holy Shrines area of the King- 
dom) and the potential unlawful activities of its non-Muslim, 
Jedda office pilots (violating the Two Holy Shrines area of the 
Kingdom), the company's failure to adopt and execute a conver- 
sion policy would be tantamount to violating the law of the 
Kingdom. Of course, such an argument might require the com- 
pany to make some showing that  Saudi law provides for vicari- 
ous corporate criminal liability with respect to violation of the 
Two Holy Shrines. The Kingdom's law apparently makes no 
such provision. Criminal liability in  the case described above 
would lie only against natural persons. And, in any case, such 
a n  argument would require stretching the language of the 
foreign law exception; something the helicopter company 
shouldn't bank on a court's being willing to do. After all, the 
courts have only grudgingly recognized the other main excep- 
tion to Title VII, the BFOQ exception.75 Why would the heli- 
copter company expect the courts to allow a liberal construction 
of the foreign law exception? 
Second, the helicopter company could admit that the for- 
eign law exception doesn't apply and argue instead that its 
75. Dothand v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 355 (1977) (stating that the BFOQ 
exception is "an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition against 
discrimination"). 
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conversion policy fits the requirements of the BFOQ excep- 
tion? Since the Kingdom, on pain of death, forbids non-Mus- 
lims from entering the haram of the Two Holy Shrines, being a 
Muslim could rightly be called a necessary occupational qualifi- 
cation for working in, around and-in the case of helicopter 
pilots--over that haram. Being a Muslim is, in this case, more 
than a mere business convenience. The lives and safety of non- 
Muslim U.S. employees are a t  stake, to say nothing of the 
helicopter company's business viability in the Kingdom. This 
line of argument doesn't require stretching the language of the 
foreign law exception. But it also doesn't take account of the 
U.S. employer-employee, master-servent, principle-agent rela- 
tionship in matters of violating foreign law, nor does it offer the 
helicopter company much assurance; for, as already indicated, 
the courts seldom acknowledge the BFOQ e~ception.~' 
B. May a U.S. Employer Discriminate Against a U S .  
Employee Within the Territorial Boundaries of the United 
States in Order to Avoid Violating the Law of the 
Foreign Country in Which the U.S. Employee 
Works or Is to Be Stationed? 
Suppose now that a private U.S. medical school specializ- 
ing in organ transplants makes special arrangements with the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to station and to maintain an organ 
transplant surgical team a t  one of the royal hospitals in Ri- 
~ a d h . ? ~  The medical school has two purposes for taking this 
action: first, the medical school wiU be able to provide a needed 
service to the Kingdom; second, the medical school will be able 
to expose its surgeons to a larger number of transplants than 
would otherwise be possible. 
Of course, the medical school makes participation in the 
Saudi program completely voluntary. But, given the opportuni- 
ties created by being able to perform an extraordinarily high 
number of transplants while in the Kingdom, participation in 
76. Id. at 1199-1203; see supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text. The court 
in Kern seemed somewhat surprised that Dynaledron failed to make this argu- 
ment, although it was available at the time. See Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 
Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 
(7th Cir. 1974) (both cases allowing the BFOQ defense in order to protect third 
parties). 
77. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 355. 
78. This hypothetical is a distillation of Abrams v.Baylor College of Medicine, 
805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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the program quickly becomes a career "must" for doctors at the 
medical school. Soon a consistent pattern develops a t  the medi- 
cal school whereby those doctors who participate in  the Saudi 
program are promoted earlier and given greater responsibilities 
than those who "choose" not to participate. In this way, the 
program becomes something less than "voluntary." 
I t  is a t  this point that problems begin to arise. The medical 
school receives Saudi program applications from two very quali- 
fied Jewish doctors. Since the medical school is not in the habit 
of making religion an issue in its employment policies and 
practices, it tentatively accepts the Jewish doctors into the 
program. Some time later, however, the medical school recalls 
that the Kingdom does not grant work visas to Jewish persons. 
Not wanting to upset its special relationship with the Kingdom, 
the medical school then decides not to advance the employer 
clearance necessary for the Jewish doctors' Saudi work visas. 
Effectively, the medical school eliminates the Jewish doctors 
from the Saudi program. Soon enough, the Jewish doctors learn 
the reason for the medical school's action and file Title VII 
charges with the EEOC. Can the medical school successfully 
claim the foreign law exception to Title VII as a defense to the 
Jewish doctors' charge? Will the foreign law exception apply to 
a U.S. employer's discriminatory, Title VII-violative acts which 
take place entirely within the territorial borders of the United 
States, but which nonetheless are aimed at preventing the 
violation of the laws of the foreign country where the U.S. 
employee works or is to be stationed??' Unfortunately, the for- 
79. The anecdote which I related in the introduction to this Comment about 
my friend's Middle Eastern job-hunting raises this same question, since my friend's 
job interview (and potentially any Title VII discrimination involved in that inter- 
view) occurred entirely within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 
If the set of fads given in this hypothetical are not enough to codbse the 
issue of whether the foreign law exception applies, a number of more confounding 
iterations of this same scenario (the "non-extraterritorial extraterritorial application" 
scenario) can easily be envisioned. The religiously motivated effective elimination of 
the Jewish doctors from the Saudi program could have been made by the organ 
transplant team coordinator (an employee of the medical school) in Riyadh, making 
it so that the discriminatory act occurred without the territorial jurisdiction and, 
arguably, within the protection of the foreign law exception. Or, in my friend's 
situation, the job interview could have taken place over the phone, with the inter- 
viewer (turned Title VII discriminator) being located in the Kingdom while my 
friend was at his home in Provo, Utah. Or, what might have happened, had the 
medical school made its discriminatory decision offshore, but in a country which 
didn't legally require such a decision, about U.S. employees presently located in the 
United States, but who were (like our Jewish doctors) to be stationed in a country 
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eign law exception does not provide answers or guidance to the 
medical school. And, the same could be said for the BFOQ 
exception.80 
So, what is the U.S. medical school to do? Assuming the 
Jewish doctors choose not to reveal their religious convictions 
on their visa applications, should the medical school endorse 
the visa applications of the Jewish doctors without revealing 
the doctors' religious background? Or, should the medical 
school violate U.S. equal employment law by failing-on reli- 
gious grounds alone-to allow the Jewish doctors to participate 
in the career-essential program? 
Besides being antithetical to  good foreign relations, the 
first option will, if discovered, jeopardize the medical school's 
opportunity t o  send other doctors to the Kingdom. The second 
option is similarly undesirable. It places the medical school in 
the odious position of either (1) denying the applications of all 
qualified Jewish doctors and facing indefensible Title VII dis- 
crimination charges, (2) denying the applications of all quali- 
fied Jewish doctors and fabricating non-discriminatory reasons 
in defense for so doing, (3) discriminating against Jewish doc- 
tors in a more discrete, subtle way, probably in the initial hir- 
ing process, or (4) terminating its highly beneficial relationship 
with the royal hospital in Riyadh. Whatever option the medical 
school chooses in this case, it is plain that the foreign law ex- 
ception, which could and probably should have been structured 
t o  give guidance in such situations, is thoroughly unhelpful. 
A third option may be available to the U.S. medical school: 
it could grant the Jewish doctors' applications and leave the di- 
rect discrimination to  the Saudi consulate. This solution may 
work. It avoids the rigors of Title VII and maintains good rela- 
tions with the Kingdom; presuming, that is, that the Saudi 
that did require that decision? The answer to questions such as this one is that, 
as of yet, there is no answer. No case law on this point has developed. However, 
it seems appropriate here to pose the possibility that the foreign law exception will 
not apply in "nonextraterritorial extraterritorial application" cases. Courts may be 
unwillingly to play cat and mouse with the situs of international employment dis- 
crimination. Furthermore, this s i t w  analysis would seem to allow, if not encourage, 
U.S. employers to travel the globe, when desirable, in order to discriminate against 
certain classes of employees or potential employees. 
80. The same could probably be said of the BFOQ exception. One reason for 
believing that the courts would not be willing to apply the foreign law exception in 
%on-extraterritorial extraterritorial application" cases is that the courts are accus- 
tomed to interpreting the BFOQ exception-one of the only other exceptions to 
Title VII in a very restrictive way. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text. 
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consulate won't mind perhaps constantly having to play the 
bad guy on the medical school's behalf. 
There are a t  least two problems with this third option. 
First, it operates on the faulty assumption that  the medical 
school wants to sacrifice some of its best doctors to the expedi- 
encies of the Saudi program-that the medical school wants to 
discriminate. The opposite is more likely to be true. The medi- 
cal school would likely want the best of its doctors, regardless 
of religious background, to be among those who receive the 
benefits of the Saudi program. Second, this last option is only 
applicable in the unique situation suggested by this particular 
hypothetical-situations where the U.S. employer has some 
foreign governmental agency to hide behind. But what of situa- 
tions such as the one described in the opening anecdote, where 
the U.S. employer pursues a Title VII-violative employment 
policy or practice in the United States in order to avoid viola- 
tion of foreign country law with no willing foreign governmen- 
tal agency to hide behind? In the opening anecdote, the U.S. 
firm was seeking to avoid a possible violation of foreign anti- 
proselyting law. Other than merely potentially implicated for- 
eign law, the U.S. firm would have no place to hide. 
C. Should the Foreign Law Exception Take Account Not Only 
of Foreign "Law" but also of Significant Non-Legal 
Factors such as Prevailing Culture, Moral 
and Traditional Expectations? 
Suppose that a Lebanese-American by the name of Bashir 
works for a U.S. based multinational enterprise with branch 
offices in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia." After several years experi- 
ence working in this company's U.S. offices, Bashir requests a 
transfer to the company's Dhahran offices. Sometime after his 
transfer-request is granted, Bashir moves with his family to 
Dhahran. 
When Bashir goes to work for the first time after arriving 
in the Kingdom, a Saudi superior notices that Bashir is wear- 
ing a small crucifm. When the superior cautiously points out to 
Bashir the inappropriateness of wearing this Christian symbol 
to work, Bashir objects, telling the Saudi superior that  in  all 
81. This hypothetical is genuinely hypothetical, although its facts may in 
some remote ways resemble those of Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v 
Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
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the years he's worked for the company he's never heard of any 
company policy prohibiting the wear of religious symbols. The 
Saudi superior, trying not to be defensive, gently explains to 
Bashir the prohibition against wearing or otherwise displaying 
non-Muslim religious symbols is local company policy aimed at 
keeping good relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in 
the office as well as between the company and the predomi- 
nantly Muslim local community and clientele. Wishing to avoid 
a scene and not wanting to be on his new superior's bad side, 
Bashir removes his crucifix, and returns to work. 
For several months following this incident, Bashir doesn't 
wear his crucifix to work. During this time, Bashir's Muslim co- 
workers befriend Bashir. Soon enough, Bashir feels a t  ease in 
his new work environment. Slowly, but subtly, however, 
Bashir's new friends begin to "pressure" him about religious 
matters. "Come to noon prayer with us, Bashir. You are Arab, 
you believe in God. Come on." Of course, Bashir's Muslim co- 
workers mean Bashir no harm-in their view they are doing 
him an eternal favor. Bashir, nevertheless, begins to feel in- 
creasingly defensive about his religious convictions. 
The whole matter comes to something of a head, however, 
for Bashir on the day he arrives a t  work and finds a copy of the 
Holy Qur'an sitting on his desk. Bashir takes the book to his 
Saudi superior and asks that such religious items not be placed 
on his desk. When his Saudi superior, in Bashir's view, re- 
sponds indifferently to this request, Bashir makes a decision. 
The next day, Bashir comes to work wearing his crucifix. A 
confrontation occurs. Bashir quits before his Saudi superior can 
fire him. Bashir, now unemployed, returns with his family to 
the United States. 
Shortly after returning to the United States Bashir files a 
Title VII charge with the EEOC. The company responds and 
invokes the foreign law exception, arguing, inter alia, that even 
if local company policy prohibiting wear of non-Muslim reli- 
gious symbols is not motivated by an express Saudi law requir- 
ing such a policy, it is motivated by a Basic System concern. 
The Kingdom's Basic System, the company points out, requires 
non-citizen residents to "observe the values of the Saudi society 
and respect its traditions and  feeling^,"'^ something Bashir 
failed to do when he wore a crucifix to work that second time. 
82. BASIC SYSTEM art. 41. 
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In the face of this set of hypothetical facts, a court might 
follow one of the following approaches. First, a court might say 
that the foreign law exception does not apply absent some spe- 
cific law requiring companies to prohibit employees from wear- 
ing or otherwise displaying non-Muslim religious symbols. A 
court taking this position might argue that the Values, Tradi- 
tions and Feelings Clause of Article 41 is overly broad and does 
not march up to U.S. or international standards of legality. 
Moreover, a court taking this position might reason that, if 
allowed so easily to negate Title VII duties in this case, the 
Values, Traditions and Feelings Clause could be used by other 
U.S. employers of U.S. employees in the Kingdom to justify 
almost any Title VII-violative policies. Although this position 
has some persuasive power, it is not the only tenable position. 
And, it may be an undesirable position in so far as it presumes 
that the only kind of "law" is the kind we are used to. 
Second, a court might take the opposite position, holding 
that the foreign law exception does apply; in effect, holding 
that the company's otherwise Title VII-violative policy of disal- 
lowing its employees from wearing or otherwise displaying non- 
Muslim religious paraphernalia was -aimed at complying with 
the Values, Traditions and Feelings Clause. Support for this 
position could be taken from other provisions of the Kingdom's 
Basic System which make it a state dutys3 and the duty of 
every Saudi citizens4 to defend the Islamic doctrine-a doc- 
trine which regards as  a "monstrous" blasphemy the Christian 
belief that Jesus Christ (pbuh) was the son of Gods5 and as 
fiction the New Testament account of the crucifixion of Jesus 
Christ (pbuh)? A court taking this second position might 
agree with the first position: that the company's Title VII-viola- 
tive policy was not intended to prevent the company from 
breaking any 'law" in the U.S. or international meaning of the 
term. But a t  this point, the court would go on to say that, be- 
cause the policy was intended to foster compliance with the 
command of the Values, Traditions and Feelings Clause, the 
foreign law exception to Title W does apply. The position here 
would be, in effect, that, if it is "law" for the Kingdom, it's law 
for the purposes of the foreign law exception. The Kingdom, 
83. Id. art. 33. 
84. Id. art. 34. 
85. HOLY QUR'AN 19:88-92. 
86. HOLY QUR'AN 4:157-8. 
424 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994 
after all, very consciously chose to adopt the Values, Traditions 
and Feelings Clause along with 28 other Basic System articles 
expressing duty and devotion to Islam. By consciously adopting 
the Shari'a as its constitution, the Kingdom consciously adopt- 
ed a religiously discriminatory legal framework and, therefore, 
U.S. employers of U.S. employees working in the Kingdom 
should be given broad latitude to function within that frame- 
work, even if this means allowing such employers to discrimi- 
nate in ways that would not be tolerated at home. 
But these two approaches only hint at a larger problem. 
The foreign law exception does not respect or give deference to 
prevailing culture, morality or tradition in  foreign countries, 
apparently even if such carries the weight of law. If it did, this 
hypothetical would likely be meaningless. By not giving such 
respect, by failing to defer to applicable prevailing foreign cus- 
tom and practice, Title VII requires that  U.S. employers disre- 
gard such. In this respect, Title VII is culturally insensitive, if 
not imperialistic. In fact, one might wonder what would happen 
if the shoe were on the other foot; if the Kingdom was in the 
business, say, of making Saudi employers insure the religious 
purity of their expatriate Saudi employees working in the Unit- 
ed States; of requiring Saudi employers to insure that their 
female Saudi employees and spouses of male Saudi employees 
wore the veil and that no Saudi employees, male or female, 
become Americanized. To be sure, we would find such a policy 
to be an intolerable imposition on our tolerant society. 
This Comment has pointed out three difficulties in apply- 
ing the foreign law exception to Title VII. First, the exception 
contemplates cases where a U.S. employer adopts Title VII- 
violative policies affecting expatriate U.S. employees with the 
aim of personally complying with the law of the foreign country 
in  which the U.S. employees work, but fails to contemplate the 
U.S. employer's occasional compelling need to adopt Title VII- 
violative policies in order to discourage its expatriate U.S. em- 
ployees from themselves violating foreign country law. Second, 
the exception provides the courts no direction regarding wheth- 
er, and to what extent, the exception ought to be applied in  
cases where U.S. employers pursue Title VII-violative policies 
and practices within the territory of the United States with the 
sole intent of complying with the law of the foreign country 
where affected U.S. employees work or are to be stationed. 
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Third, the exception presumes that the only foreign country 
concerns worthy of Title VII exception are legal concerns. This 
overlooks the reality that other countries express values worthy 
of legislative or judicial concern in  the United States in very 
non-legal terms--other countries might have non-legal func- 
tional equivalents to what we regard as law. 
Tentative legislative solutions to problems one and three 
may prove the easiest to formulate. As to problem one, it might 
be suggested that the language of the foreign law exception be 
refrarned as follows: 
I t  shall not be unlawful [under the sections of Title VII which 
regulate employment practices] for an employer (or a corpora- 
tion controlled by an employer), labor organization, employ- 
ment agency, or joint labor-management committee control- 
ling apprenticeship or other training or retraining (including 
on-the-job training programs) to take any action otherwise 
prohibited by such section, with respect to an employee in a 
workplace in a foreign country if compliance with such section 
would cause such employer (or such corporation), such organi- 
zation, such agency, or such committee to violate the law of 
the foreign country in which such workplace is located. Such 
employer (or such corporation), such organization, such agen- 
cy, or such committee may also recur to this exception, when 
taking actions reasonably calculated and intended solely to 
discourage such employee from violating the law of the foreign 
country where the workplace is located." 
As to problem three, it might be suggested that the lan- 
guage of the foreign law exception be redrafted as follows: 
It  shall not be unlawful [under the sections of Title VII which 
regulate employment practices] for an employer (or a corpora- 
tion controlled by an employer), labor organization, employ- 
ment agency or joint labor-management committee controlling 
apprenticeship or  other training or retraining (including on- 
the-job training programs) to take any action otherwise pro- 
hibited by such section, with respect to an employee in a 
workplace in a foreign country if compliance with such section 
would cause such employer (or such corporation), such organi- 
zation, such agency, or such committee to violate the law of or 
the functional equivalent of law in the foreign country in 
which such workplace is located. Functional equivalents of 
87. 42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-l(b) (Supp. 1992) (suggested revisions in italics). 
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law in a foreign country may include overwhelmingly perva- 
sive cultural, moral, or traditional custom or practice.88 
As to problem two, no easy solution seems readily appar- 
ent. Conflicts of law doctrines could prove useful in solving the 
localization. But such doctrines vary from state to state and, 
therefore, uniformity of result will suffer. If nothing else, how- 
ever, the localization doctrines found in the corpus of conflicts 
of law may serve as a well-considered starting point for con- 
gressional inquiry into the solution of this problem. But the 
consideration of the conflicts aspects of this problem are sadly 
beyond the scope of this Comment. 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE FOREIGN LAW EXCEPTION 
Is Too NARROWLY DRAWN 
Title VII applies extraterritorially to U.S. employers of 
expatriate U.S. employees, except when compliance with Title 
VII would cause the U.S. employer to violate the law of the 
foreign country in which the U.S. employees work. 
This foreign law exception fails to fulfill its intended func- 
tions, not the least of which is the protection of U.S. employers 
of U.S. employees abroad from "Catch 22" s i tua-  
tions--situations where, on the one hand, compliance with 
foreign country law means failure to comply with Title VII and, 
88. Id. (suggested revisions in italics). Assuming the suggested solutions to 
problems one and three were simultaneously adopted, the solution to problem one 
would need to be further adjusted as follows: 
Such employer (or such corporation), such organization, such agency, such 
committee may also recur to this exception when taking such actions, so 
long as such actions are reasonably calculated and intended solely to 
discourage such employee from violating the law of or the functional 
equivalent of law in the foreign country where the workplace is located. 
Id. (suggested revision in italics). 
The author would also add the following modifications clarifjing the scope and 
operation of the reformulation: 
For the purposes of this section, determinations respecting any such func- 
tional equivalents of foreign law may be made on judicial notice taken on 
the same grounds and in the same manner as is the case with foreign 
law. The mere presence of law or a legal system in the foreign country 
will not necessarily preclude recurrence to a functional equivalent under 
this section, unless such law or legal system is patently contrary to the 
imputed functional equivalent. 
Other rational reformulations of the exception could, of course, be conceived. 
The author does not suppose these suggested reformulations to be anything more 
than a first effort at  reformulation. 
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on the other hand, compliance with Title VII means failure to 
comply with foreign country law. The foreign law exception 
fails in this regard because it is overly simplistic. It incorrectly 
assumes that international discriminatory conduct happens 
either here or there. I t  naively fails to contemplate the problem 
of localizing international discriminatory conduct. 
The exception fails, because it does not indicate whether 
the U.S. employer may invoke the exception to prevent U.S. 
employees from violating the laws of the foreign country in  
which they work. The exception presumes that the only conduct 
which U.S. employers have a vested interest in regulating is 
their own, and not that of their expatriate U.S. employees. This 
failure puts U.S. employers of U.S. employees abroad in the 
uncomfrotable position of not knowing when the exception will 
apply and when it will not. 
Finally, the foreign law exception fails, because it contem- 
plates only foreign legal concerns as concerns worthy of Title 
VII exception; it fails to respect even the most significant for- 
eign cultural, moral, traditional concerns, thus creating the 
specter of cultural imperialism. Of course, one could argue the 
desirability of making U.S. employers bite the bullet abroad 
and apply Title VII, even when giving offense is the result. The 
point of Title VII is, or so the argument would go, the guaran- 
tee of what are internationally recognized human and civil 
rights. In the hypotheticals examined above, for example, the 
right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of religion is 
a right of this genre. On the other hand, by reaching beyond 
our borders and into the borders of the Kingdom, even into the 
haram of the Two Holy Shrines, perhaps Title VII violates one 
of its own highest values-the value of being religiously toler- 
ant. Could it be that vis a vis its extraterritorial application, 
Title VII exposes a n  even higher form of intolerance? One 
might call it, the intolerance of the tolerant. 
James David Phipps 
